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Abstract
The debate in the literature about the Double Dividend Hypothesis has focused on whether
an environmental policy raises revenue that can be used to cut other distorting taxes.  In this
paper, we show that this focus is misplaced.  We derive welfare results for alternative policies in a
series of analytical general equilibrium models with clean and dirty goods that might be produced
using emissions as well as other resources, in the presence of other pre-existing distortions such as
labor taxes or even monopoly pricing.  We show that revenue-raising and non-revenue-raising
policies can achieve equivalent welfare-raising effects of environmental protection without
exacerbating the labor distortion.  These favorable effects can be achieved by taxes that raise
revenue, certain command and control regulations that raise no revenue, and even subsidies that
cost revenue.  Instead, the exacerbation of the pre-existing labor tax distortion is associated with
policies that generate privately-retained scarcity rents.  These rents raise costs of production, raise
equilibrium output prices, and thus reduce the real net wage.  Such policies include both
quantity-restricting command and control policies and certain marketable permit policies.
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and NBER and NBERPapers that compare such environmental taxes to CAC regulation include Terkla (1984),
1
Parry (1995), and Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw (1996).
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Considerable attention has centered recently on the hypothesis that taxes on polluting
activities might yield a "double dividend" by not only helping to protect the environment but also
helping to raise revenue that can be used to reduce other distorting taxes.  This second dividend
only arises, however, if the pollution tax is less distorting than the existing tax it replaces.  As
shown in Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), the pollution tax itself raises product prices and thus
reduces the real net wage.  It can thus reduce labor supply and welfare by just as much as a tax on
labor that it replaces.  Indeed, if pre-existing taxes are already set optimally in terms of tax
distortions, then the pollution tax could only do as well and might do worse than the pre-existing
tax system (setting aside the environmental benefits).  In practice, actual tax rates are not set
optimally, so the debate has focused on circumstances in which the pollution tax might be less
distorting than some existing tax.  This voluminous literature is reviewed in Goulder (1995) and
Oates (1995).
What seems obvious in this debate is that the pollution tax must raise welfare more than
some other command and control (CAC) policy with the same environmental protection but
which does not raise any revenue to reduce those other distorting taxes.  If a pollution tax and a
CAC pollution restriction have similar effects on product prices and thus on the real net wage,
then they both exacerbate labor tax distortions, and only a revenue-raising instrument offers the
chance to reduce the labor tax rate and thus to offset that negative effect on welfare.
1
Indeed, the entire focus of the Double Dividend Hypothesis is on the welfare-raising
potential of the revenue from the pollution tax.  In this paper we show that this focus is misplaced. 
In particular, we show that revenue-raising and non-revenue-raising policies can achieveMultiple distortions have been analyzed in partial equilibrium models (e.g. Barnett, 1980,
2
or Browning, 1994), or computable general equilibrium models (e.g. Harris, 1984), but our model
below is the only one we are aware of that finds analytical solutions for a general equilibrium with
all three distortions simultaneously: a tax that distorts labor supply decisions, a monopoly that
distorts output decisions, and an environmental externality that distorts input decisions. 
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equivalent welfare-raising effects of environmental protection without exacerbating the pre-
existing distortions.  These favorable effects can be achieved by taxes that raise revenue, certain
CAC regulations that raise no revenue, and even subsidies that cost revenue.  Instead, the
exacerbation of the pre-existing tax distortion is associated with policies that generate privately-
retained scarcity rents.  It is those rents which in turn raise costs of production, raise equilibrium
output prices, and thus reduce the real wage.  Such policies include both quantity-restricting
command and control policies and marketable permit policies in which the permits are given to
existing polluters.
In a single general equilibrium framework, we solve analytically for expressions that show
all relevant effects of a number of policies on the equilibrium quantity of emissions, the quantity
and price of each output,  the generation of profits, price and income effects on labor supply,  the
improvement in the environment, and the net effect on welfare.  We use the same model to
provide comparable analyses of at least five kinds of environmental policies, including: a pollution
tax, an environmental subsidy, tradeable permits, a CAC policy that restrict emissions, and a
different CAC policy that restricts technology.  We analyze the same set of policies for alternative
versions of the model, including one version with fixed emissions per unit of output, another
version with variable emissions per unit of output, and a third version with a pre-existing
monopoly distortion in the market for the polluting good.  
2
We proceed in the first section below to overview our model and results.  Section II then
specifies the general equilibrium model, while subsequent sections present results for (III) theAs described below, these results employ an initial labor tax rate of 40%, an
3
uncompensated labor supply elasticity of 0.3, and a compensated labor supply elasticity of 0.6. 
The welfare cost "triangle" from this labor tax is substantial, and any policy that raises product
prices and reduces the real net wage effectively adds to the wide side of this triangle.
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fixed-emissions case, (IV) the variable-emissions case, (V) an environmental subsidy, (VI)
technology restrictions, and (VII) the monopoly model.  Section VIII concludes.
I. An Overview
We start with many identical consumers that maximize utility defined over a clean good, a
dirty good, leisure, environmental quality, and a government provided public good.  With linear
production using only one resource, the model and results of Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994)
represent a special case of ours.  Starting with an uncorrected externality and a pre-existing labor
tax, we introduce  a small permit or CAC policy that begins to restrict the quantity of pollution,
and we solve for equilibrium prices, profits, labor supply, and welfare.  As in Parry (1995), but
using a more explicit utility-maximization framework for welfare results, we insert plausible
parameter values to show that the gain from environmental improvement is more than offset by
the loss from exacerbating the labor supply distortion.   
3
We then extend the model to consider variable emissions per unit of output.  One might
write a production function for the dirty good where both the output and the waste by-product
are produced using inputs like labor, capital, and other resources.  Using a device common in
environmental economics, however, we simply move the waste emissions to the other side of the
equation.  In other words, we view emissions as an input to production, with its own downward
sloping marginal product curve (since successive units of emissions are less crucial to production). 
In addition, we modify that production function by lumping together labor, capital and other
resources.  Distinction among these inputs is not necessary for any of the points we make below. Analogously, Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) show that if the environmental tax revenue
4
is returned to consumers in a lump sum fashion, instead of reducing the labor tax rate, then labor
supply falls and net welfare may fall.
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Therefore, in our model, one "clean" good is produced using just this single resource, and one
"dirty" output is produced using only two inputs: one input is same kind of resource (labor or
capital) used elsewhere in the economy, and the other input is "emissions."  The elasticity of
substitution between these two inputs will help determine pollution abatement possibilities. 
Finally, we specify that these wastes themselves are associated with some use of resources (labor
or capital) necessary to transport and dispose of them.
Using this variable-emissions model, we derive new expressions for general equilibrium
outcomes and again calculate welfare effects.  We also show the sensitivity of results to
alternative parameter values.  We use this model to analyze a tax on emissions (generalizing
Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994), a permit or other restriction on emissions (as in Parry, 1995), or
an environmental subsidy (as in a different paper by Parry, 1996).  We confirm prior results that
the tax on emissions does not exacerbate the labor supply distortion, if the revenues are used to
reduce the pre-existing labor tax rate, because the effect of higher product prices on the real net
wage is effectively offset by the reduction in the labor tax.
This emissions tax is equivalent to a policy in which permits are sold by government, if we
still assume that the revenue is used to reduce the labor tax rate.  In actual permit schemes like the
sulfur dioxide provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, however, most of the
permits are handed out for free to existing firms in a way that allows permit recipients to keep the
scarcity rents.  If a profits tax does not usurp all of those rents, then we show that government
does not have enough revenue to reduce the labor tax enough to offset the effect of higher prices
on the real net wage.   
4They decompose the welfare impact of the controls into 1) a revenue recycling effect, 2)
5
a tax interaction effect, and 3) an environmental effect.  This breakdown provides a useful basis
for interpreting their simulation results.
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Several papers have focused on the revenue-raising potential of various policies.  For
example, Parry (1995) shows that a non-revenue-raising policy to restrict dirty activities (by a
quota or limited number of permits) still raises output price and exacerbates labor tax distortions. 
This negative effect on welfare can exceed the positive effect from environmental improvements. 
Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw (1996) provide both an analytical model and a computable general
equilibrium (CGE) model of the U.S. economy in which they compare revenue-raising instruments
(emissions taxes) and non-revenue-raising instruments (permits that are given away) to abate
sulfur dioxide emissions.   They find that the revenue-raising policy always yields higher welfare
5
than the non-revenue-raising policy, and again find that the latter can actually reduce welfare.
They thus conclude that raising revenue is a crucial to understanding the welfare impact of
environmental controls.   
For these two policies, welfare certainly is higher for the one that raises revenue.  Indeed,
the entire double-dividend literature focuses on the revenue from pollution taxes.  In this paper,
however, we depart from the Double Dividend literature in several important ways.  First, we
provide results for more types of policies such as a subsidy to the clean good, or a restriction on
the technology of producing the dirty good.  This contribution is important, because it clarifies
that the key distinction is not between revenue-raising and non-revenue-raising policies.  A
subsidy to the clean good is a revenue-loser, and must be financed by raising the labor tax rate,
but we show that it has the same favorable net welfare effects as the tax on the dirty good -- a tax
that generates revenue used to cut the labor tax rate.  The reason is that the subsidy reduces
product prices in a way that raises the real net wage enough to offset the required increase in the- 6 -
labor tax rate.  Moreover, we evaluate a different kind of CAC policy that restricts technologies
instead of emissions.  This CAC policy raises no revenue, but it still achieves the same favorable
welfare effects as the tax or subsidy policies.  The key difference is that this CAC policy does not
create rents.  We conclude that the appropriate emphasis in environmental policy design is not on
revenue raising, but on avoiding conditions that generate privately-retained profits which in turn
increase costs and reduce the real net wage.
Second, for this reason, we focus our attention on the nature of the mechanism that
creates scarcity rents, and on the disposition of those rents.  We allow government to use another
policy parameter, a tax rate on profits, and we show how welfare depends critically on this
parameter.  Only if government gets 100% of the rents can the labor tax rate be reduced enough
to eliminate adverse effects on the labor supply distortion.  As a consequence, a revenue-raising
policy of selling some portion of the permits or taxing some portion of the rents provides
unambiguously lower welfare in our model than the non-revenue-raising CAC technology
restriction that avoids the creation of the rents in the first place.
Third, we extend results to the case with a pre-existing monopoly distortion as well as the
pre-existing labor supply distortion.  Environmental policy might then exacerbate both distortions,
by raising further the price of the monopolized output and reducing further the real net wage rate.
II.  The Model
Our goal is to analyze and compare the impacts of different policies such as tradeable
pollution permits, command and control (CAC) regulation, a tax on emissions, or a subsidy for
pollution abatement.  In particular, we wish to compare all such policies within a single model. 
For this purpose, we develop a simple model with  N identical individuals who own a singleOur framework is similar to that of Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), but they employ
6
only linear production with a fixed amount of pollution per unit output, and they analyze only a
tax on the dirty good.  We consider more general production with variable pollution per unit
output, and we analyze all four kinds of policies listed in the text.
These considerations might also affect the choice among policy instruments.  Other
7
models have analyzed uncertainty (Weitzman, 1974), monitoring and enforcement costs (Russell,
1990), and transactions costs (Stavins, 1995).  The large literature on the choice among policy
instruments is reviewed in Bohm and Russell (1985).  Constant returns to scale means that all
firms are identical in our model, but if abatement costs differ significantly among firms with
different technologies, and if regulators have imperfect information about these differences, then
imperfect CAC policies can be six to ten times as expensive as the minimum abatement cost made
possible by incentive-based policies like taxes or permits (see Atkinson and Lewis, 1974, Seskin,
Anderson and Reid, 1983, and other studies surveyed in Cropper and Oates, 1992, p. 686).
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resource and sell it in the market to earn income that can be used to buy two different goods.
6
A. The Basic Set-up
This static model considers only one time period, with no saving decision.  For simplicity
we refer to the resource as time available for labor supply, but under some conditions it can be
interpreted more generally as a fixed total amount of labor, capital, land, and any other resource
that can be sold in the market (in amount  L) or used at home (in amount  L ).  The resource kept H
at home could be interpreted either as leisure or as a resource used in home production.  We
assume perfect certainty, no transactions costs, and constant returns to scale production.
7
Each individual receives utility from per-capita amounts of a nonpolluting good (X), a
polluting good (Y), and leisure (L ), and from the total amounts of a government-provided H
nonrival public good (G), and another nonrival public good called environmental quality (E).  The
per-capita amount  Y  is produced using per-capita amounts of labor (L ) and of emissions (Z).  Y
Total emissions  (NZ)  negatively affect environmental quality through: 
(1) E = e(NZ) ,        where   eN < 0.
The other goods are produced according to:Note that emissions are positively related to the use of these resources:  L   is not to
8
Z
clean up or reduce emissions, but just to cart it away.  Abatement is undertaken by substituting
away from  Z  and into  L .  This overall production function is still constant returns to scale, Y
since  Z  is a linear function of  L .  The private cost for emissions helps justify our assumption of z
an internal solution with a finite choice for  Z, even without corrective government policy.
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(2a) X = LX
(2b) Y = F(L , Z) Y
(2c) G = NL   G
We define a unit of  X  as the amount that can be produced using one unit of labor.  The
numeraire good is  L, or equivalently  X.  Then  Y  is produced in a constant returns to scale
function (F), using clean labor (L ) and emissions (Z).  These emissions may include gaseous, Y
liquid, or solid wastes that require some private costs for removal and disposal.   These private
disposal costs must come in the form of resources used, so we define one unit of emissions as the
amount that requires one unit of private resources (Z = L ).   Thus, the private cost of  Z  is Z
8
always 1.  We define a unit of  Y such that its initial competitive equilibrium price is  p  = 1.  Y
Finally, some labor (L ) is also used to produce the public good.  The combination of these G
production relationships provides the overall resource constraint:
(3) NL = NX + N(L  + L ) + G . Y Z
Individuals maximize:
(4) ￿ = U(X, Y, L , G, E) + 8[(1-t )L + M - X - p Y] H L Y
by their choice of  X, Y, and  L , where  t   is the tax rate on resource (labor) supply, and  M  is H L
nonlabor income discussed below.  Taxable labor supply is  L = L  + L  + L  + L .  A subscript X Y Z G
on  U  indicates a partial derivative (marginal utility), and  U   is the partial of  U  with respect to H
L , so these individuals set  U  = U /p  =  U /(1-t ) = 8, the marginal utility of income. H X Y Y H L
Our approach is to start at an initial competitive equilibrium with an existing tax on labor,dU
8L
’ ˆ LZ ’ tLˆ L & µ Z
L
ˆ Z
(ˆ L ’ dL/L)




but without any policy correction for the external effect of  Z  on  E, and then to analyze small
changes.  The effect of any such change on utility can be found by total differentiating U:
(5) dU = U dX + U dY - U dL + U e'NdZ X Y H E
where  G  is held fixed by assumption.   Thus, to balance the government's budget, any
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externality-correcting policy that reduces labor supply must also specify how the lost labor tax
revenue will be recovered.  Substituting the consumer's first order conditions into (5) yields:
(6) dU = 8dX + 8p dY - 8(1-t )dL + U e'NdZ Y L E
Totally differentiate the resource constraint (3), with  dG = 0, to get  dX = dL-dL -dL , and thus: Y Z
(7) dU/8 = t dL - µdZ + (p dY - dL  - dL ) L Y Y Z
where  dL  = dZ, and where  µ  is defined as  -NU e'/ 8.  This  µ>0  is the dollar value of  lost Z E
utility to all individuals from a marginal increase in emissions, that is, "marginal social damage".
Next, totally differentiate the production function for Y:
(8) dY  =  F dL  + F dZ  Y Y Z
where  F  and  F   are the marginal products of  L   and  Z.   Assuming profit maximization (and Y  Z Y
a zero initial tax on emissions), these marginal products are equal to factor prices divided by
output price:  F  = F  = 1/p  = 1.  Thus, from (8), the expression in parentheses in (7) is zero.  Y Z Y
We divide (7) by  L, and use a hat over a variable to indicate a rate of change  .  Thus:
This equation represents our first main result.  The left-hand side is the dollar value of the change
in utility  (dU/8), divided by  national income (L).  On the right-hand side are two terms.  Theˆ Z
ˆ L
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policy under consideration is a mandated reduction in emissions, or some incentive that reduces
emissions, so   < 0.  Thus the second term on the right-hand side of (9) is an unambiguous
increase in utility from abating pollution.  The impact will depend on the importance of the
externality (size of µ), the percentage reduction in Z, and the initial size of  Z  relative to the size
of the economy.  In the first term, however, utility is also affected by a pre-existing labor tax (tL
>0).  If the policy reduces labor supply, utility will fall by the exacerbation of a pre-existing labor
supply distortion.  The overall effect on welfare depends on the change in labor supply, and on the
relative size of these two terms.
B. Alternative Policies, Profits, and Revenues
In order to derive an expression for the change in labor supply,  , we need to trace the
effect of the policy on the price of emissions, the price of output, and thus on the real net wage. 
We also need to trace the effect of the policy on income flows that might also affect labor supply. 
These income effects include the possibility that the policy generates private profits.   
Any policy to reduce  Z  will raise the marginal product of  Z  above its private cost.  If
the government imposes a tax on emissions, or sells a limited number of emission permits, then
the firm faces a price  p   that equals the private resource cost plus the tax or the price of the Z
permit.  For these two policies, the scarcity rent goes to the government.
If the limited number of permits are handed out for free, however, then the scarcity rent
goes to the permit recipient.  These permits can be used by the recipients, to yield a marginal
product of emissions greater than the private cost of emissions, or they can be sold.  Either way,
the policy has generated a private profit.  We define these profits as:
(10) A = (p  -1)Z Z
The rules for the initial allocation of these permits does not matter in our model, because theˆ Z
Buchanan and Tullock (1975) and Maloney and McCormick (1982).
10
These profits still arise with substitution between  L   and  Z.  In our model, with perfect
11
Y
competition and constant returns to scale, identical firms would have no reason to buy or sell
permits from each other anyway, so the tradeable permit equilibrium (with scarcity rents) must be
functionally equivalent to the CAC equilibrium (with each firm's emissions limited to 90% of last
year's level).  The point is that the firm does not have to sell the permit to receive a profit: a
mandated restriction still raises the marginal product of  Z  above its cost.
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single representative agent must own whatever firm or other entity is given the permits.  These
profits become part of nonlabor income,  M  in equation (4).
These profits may arise for some kinds of command-and-control (CAC) policies as well. 
One example is a "new source performance standard" that requires an expensive technology for
new firms only, raising the marginal cost of production (and thus the equilibrium price of output)
without affecting the cost of production for old firms.  The result is an entry barrier that provides
profits to old firms.   Our model does not distinguish new firms from old firms, but profits can
10
arise in other ways.  For the simplest example, consider the special case where  production of  Y 
uses fixed combinations of  L   and  Z.  Then a restriction on  Z  is equivalent to a restriction on  Y
Y.  What happens if all firms are required to produce at 90% of last year's level?  The result is a
government-mandated cartel that allows all firms to charge a price greater than marginal cost.
11
We start at a competitive equilibrium with no environmental policy and zero profits, and
we introduce a new policy such as   < 0.  Any generated profits might affect consumer behavior
and government revenue.  Thus, prior to any policy,  p  = 1  and  A  in equation (10) is zero.  The Z
change in profits (dA) equals  (Zdp  + p dZ - dZ), which equals  Zdp  (since the initial  p  is 1). z z z  z
We now specify how the government responds to a loss in tax base.   A general way to
state the government budget constraint is:
(11)  G = Nt L + Nt A L Aˆ tL ’ &
tL
1&tL












ˆ L ˆ pZ
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(12)
where  t   is a tax on profits.  We can then set this tax rate (exogenously) to 1.0 for any case A
where government receives the scarcity rent, such as for an emissions tax or sale of permits, and
we set it to zero for the other extreme where private parties keep the rents.  This specification
also allows us to consider the case where a pre-existing corporate profits tax rate would take part
of the firm's private profits.   We do not adjust this tax rate endogenously to help maintain the
necessary revenue to pay for  G, but its existence greatly affects the amount by which the labor
tax might have to be adjusted.  Suppose, for example, that a permit or CAC policy generates
profits but also reduces labor supply and thus labor tax revenue.  If the tax rate on profits is zero,
then the government will have to raise the labor tax rate and exacerbate labor supply distortions. 
If  t   equals 1, then the government may be able to reduce the labor tax rate. A
Differentiate the government budget (eq. 11), set  dG = 0, and use  dA = Zdp , to get:  z
where   .   This is the rate at which government will
have to change the labor tax.  To evaluate this expression, we need expressions for     and    .
C. Effects on Labor Supply
To determine specific effects on labor supply, we follow Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994)
by assuming that  G  and  E  are separable in utility from leisure and consumption goods, and that
the combination of consumption goods is homothetic and separable from leisure.  Therefore:
(13) U = U(V[Q(X,Y),L ], G, E) H
where  Q  is a homothetic function of  X  and  Y.  The household budget constraint is given by:
(14) X + p Y = (1-t )L + (1-t )A Y L Aˆ pY ’ Z/Y ˆ pZ




ˆ L & (1&tA)N Z
Y
ˆ pZ
ˆ L ’ , ˆ w % (1&tA)0N Z
Y
ˆ pZ
ˆ pQ ’ Nˆ pY
ˆ pY ’ Z/Y ˆ pZ
Profits are created by  p  >1, but the firm breaks even on output given that higher cost of 
12
Z
Z.  The zero-profits condition is  p Y = L  + p Z.  Totally differentiate, and use the fact shown Y Y Z






Define  w  as the real net wage, so  w = (1-t )/p   where  p   is a price index on Q(X,Y).  This L Q Q
price index assigns a weight  N  to  p , so   .  Totally differentiate the real net wage: Y
This equation says that the real net wage falls if either the tax on labor were to rise, or if the price
of consumption goods were to rise.  Next we find how  p   is related to the cost of  Z  by using Y
the zero-profits condition to show that   .   Then, using (12) in (15), we have:
12
Labor is chosen by maximizing the sub-utility function  V(Q,L )  subject to: H
(17) Q = wL + (1-t )A/p A Q
We can write the labor supply function resulting from this maximization problem as  L = 
L(w, (1-t )A/p ).  Totally differentiating this function yields: A Q
where  ,  is the uncompensated labor supply elasticity, and  0  is the income elasticity of labor
supply.  Substituting equation (16) into (18) gives the labor supply response as a function of the
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The point of this equation is that environmental policy raises the cost of emissions, and thus the
cost of output, in a way that reduces the real net wage and affects labor supply.  Notice that the
tax on profits  t   is very important for damping the impact of a price change on labor supply.  In A
the limit when all profits are taxed away, labor supply does not respond at all!
We still need to show how  p   depends on a policy such as   < 0.  In particular, the Z
increase in  p   depends on the demand for  Z, which depends on the demand for Y. Z
D.  Effects on Output of the Polluting Good
The demand for  Y  is based on the consumer's maximization of  Q(X,Y), where we define
F   as the elasticity of substitution.  Given this definition, and given that the price of  X  always Q
equals 1, we have the basic behavioral relationship:
We need to eliminate     from the expression.  Totally differentiate the household budget
constraint (14), without holding any variables constant:
Substitute this last expression into (20) and rearrange to get:ˆ R/ˆ tL ’ (1&tL)/tL & ,




ˆ pY / (Yˆ pY
ˆ L ’ (1&tA)
(1&tA)(1&tL)N(0&,)
(1&tA)N(0&,)&FQ(1&N)(1&tL&,tL)
ˆ Y / (1&tA)) ˆ Y
ˆ Y ˆ pY
ˆ Z ˆ Y ’ ˆ Z
This condition will be satisfied if the initial point is on the normal side of the Laffer
13






The first two terms give the income effect on  Y  from the change in labor income, which
implicitly incorporates the government's adjustment of  t .  The third term represents the income L
effect of profits on the demand for Y.  The last term is the substitution effect.  
Next, we substitute equations (16) and (19) into (21) to obtain    as a function of   :
The expression  (   represents the full general equilibrium response of  Y  to a change in its price, Y
incorporating the household behavior as well as the government budget constraint.
Finally, we combine equations (19) and (22) to obtain:
To guarantee that  )>0, we assume that leisure is a normal good (0<0), and that the labor supply
curve is not backward-bending (,$0).  Thus the numerator is negative, and the denominator is
negative as long as  , < (1-t )/t .   In a later section we show how the mandated reduction in L L
13
emissions ( <0) also reduces Y.  In the simplest case with fixed coefficients,  .  Equation
(23) then says the following: if government acquires all the rents for use in reducing labor tax
rates (that is, if  t  = 1), then the policy will not affect labor supply and will not exacerbate labor AdU
8L
’ tL(1&tA)) & µ Y
L
ˆ Y / & Rˆ Y
ˆ Y ’ ˆ Z ˆ pY ’ ˆ pZ
ˆ Y
Examples include gasoline, and cigarettes, where the environmental problem is not from
14
one of the inputs to production, but from the use of the final product.  For these two examples, it
is easy to see how a mandated reduction of every firm's output could generate private profits!
- 16 -
(24)
tax distortions.  Otherwise, labor supply will fall. 
III.  Results With Fixed Pollution Per Unit Output
Before continuing the derivations for the general case with variable emissions, we can
pause to provide some numerical results for a special case with fixed emissions.  In fact, suppose
the good itself generates externalities either in production or in consumption, that is, where  Y =
Z.   Then   , and   .  In above formulas, we assume  Z/Y  equals  1, and  L  
14
Y
equals  0.  Then substitute equation (23) into (9) to obtain the welfare impact:
Utility increases only if the cost of the larger labor supply distortion (t (1-t ))) is less than the L A
benefits from reducing pollution (µY/L).  Since    is negative, the sign of  R indicates the net
effect on welfare.
Consider plausible magnitudes for the various parameters in (24).  For  t , we want a tax L
rate that applies to income from all household resources (that is, national income).  Total
government spending in the U.S. is roughly 35% of national income, but incentives depend on a
marginal tax rate that exceeds this average tax rate.  We feel that  t = 0.5  would be a reasonable L 
choice to account for the progressive federal income tax, plus payroll tax, plus state and local
income taxes, plus sales and excise taxes.  All of these taxes apply to market goods and not to
leisure.   However, since the rate in our model is both an average rate and a marginal rate, weAn overall labor tax rate of 0.4 has become a standard assumption in the literature on
15
marginal excess burden, including Stuart (1984) and Browning (1987).
For the next section, we also need an elasticity of substitution in production, F .  Again
16
Y
this parameter has not been estimated for our particular aggregation into two inputs.  Caddy
(1976) surveys estimates of the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital, and finds
values that vary across industries in the range of 0.5 to 1.0.  Hamermesh provides an extensive
- 17 -
settle on  t  = 0.4.    L
15
For the uncompensated labor supply elasticity  ,, we need a single value to represent an
aggregate of all potential workers and all labor supply effects associated with changes in wages. 
As discussed in Rosen (1976), these effects include not only hours worked, but also participation
decisions and effort on the job.  Thus, the typical hours elasticity likely understates the overall
impact of changes in the real net wage.  Russek (1996) surveys many estimates of wage and
income elasticities for both men and women that take into account both hours and participation. 
He finds that the aggregate uncompensated wage elasticity lies between 0.15 and 0.30.  The
aggregate income elasticity is about -0.30 for women and lies between -0.30 and zero for men. 
Feldstein (1995) points out other behavioral alternatives to taxable labor supply, and he finds that
the relevant elasticity is at least 1.0 and could be higher.  To be conservative, we choose a base
value of  0.3  for the wage elasticity (,), and  -0.3  for the income elasticity (0).  In combination,
the compensated labor supply elasticity  (,-0)  is  0.6.  Note, by the way, that CAC or permit
polices will still affect welfare, even if  ,  were  0, because profits have an income effect that
reduce labor supply and thus still exacerbate pre-existing distortions.
Estimates for the elasticity of substitution in consumption,  F , are not available for the Q
specific aggregation in our model between a "clean" good  X  and a "dirty" good  Y.  We choose
a base value of 1.0, which is broadly consistent with the empirical literature on substitution in
consumption, and we test the sensitivity of results to alternative values.
16survey of measured elasticities of substitution between capital and labor and concludes that a
value of 1 is reasonable.  Berndt and Wood (1975) and others estimate translog KLEM
production functions (for capital, labor, energy, and materials).  We cannot use all of these cross-
price elasticities directly in our model, because our first input is resources (which includes both
labor and capital), and our other input is emissions (which is not the same as energy).  Again we
feel this literature is broadly consistent with a unitary elasticity of substitution, but we present
results for other values as well.




For  N, we want an aggregate expenditure share for all goods with externalities in
production or consumption.  Based on 1993 data reported in the Statistical Abstract of the United
States, the industries most responsible for pollution include chemical and paper producers, mining
and primary metal industries, electric utilities, petroleum and coal production and processing, and
motor vehicles and equipment.  Total production by those industries constitutes 13% of GDP, and
we  use  0.15  for  Y/L.   Since  N  is defined as  Y/[L(1-t )], and since  t  = 0.4, we must have 
17
L L
N = 1/4.  In other words,  these polluting goods are primarily private goods, so 15% of total
output represents a quarter of private consumption.
Finally, we need a measure of marginal environmental damage (µ).  Pearce and Turner
(1990) review studies finding that damages from pollution are 0.5% to 0.9% of GNP in the
Netherlands.  Wicke (1990) reports estimates of 6% of GNP in Germany.  Freeman (1982)
estimates that pollution damages would be about 1.25% of GNP or higher in the United States in
the absence of environmental polices.  Unfortunately, none of these sources provide a measure of
marginal environmental damages.  Based on the figures just mentioned, we assume that total
damages are 2% of total output.  Then, since  Y  is 15% of total output, we have damages that
are 13% of  Y.    Given the likelihood that marginal damages exceed average damages, we choose
µ = 0.20 as our base case.  There is tremendous uncertainty associated with this number and soˆ Y
Because this permit or CAC policy leaves the scarcity rents in private hands, it is
18
equivalent to a policy that imposes an environmental tax on  Y  and then uses the revenue for a
lump sum transfer to households (instead of using the revenue to reduce the labor tax rate).  Such
an environmental tax policy reduces welfare just like the permit or CAC policy.
- 19 -
we also provide results for social marginal damages equal to 0.40.  However, since µ enters
linearly into the final welfare impact (equation 24), readers can easily substitute any preferred
value. 
Table 1 shows the effects of a permit or CAC policy that mandates a small reduction in the
quantity of the polluting good  ( < 0).  The first section of four columns show assumed values
for some of the input parameters.  Next we show the gain from reducing the externality.  The next
section with two columns show the welfare loss from exacerbating the pre-existing labor
distortion, and R,  the net effect on welfare for the case when scarcity rents are untaxed.    The
18
final section with two columns presents results for the case where scarcity rents are taxed at the
same level as labor income.
The first row shows our base-case parameter values.  A 1% reduction in Y yields benefits
from reduced pollution that are 0.030% of national income.  In the case where scarcity rents are
not taxed,  ) = 0.178, so a 1% reduction in output induces a  0.178% reduction in labor supply. 
Multiplication by the tax rate (0.4) yields a welfare cost from the labor supply reduction that is 
0.071% of national income.  Taking into account the environmental gains and the labor market
losses, the net effect is a reduction in welfare equal to 0.041% of national income.   Taxing
scarcity rents mitigates the labor market distortion somewhat.  Labor supply now only falls by
0.12% and the labor market distortion reduces welfare by 0.048%.  Again, the gain from reducing
pollution is more than offset by the increased labor market distortion and welfare falls by 0.018%. 
As we increase the tax on rents, the labor market distortion falls until we reach the limit of 100%This case with  t  = 1 corresponds exactly to the case of Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994)
19
A
where a tax on the dirty good generates revenues used to reduce the tax on labor income.  See
equation (13) in their paper, when their initial  t   equals 0. D
When we change  t  from 0.4 to 0.3, we assume that  N  remains at 1/4, so Y/L = N(1-t )
20
L L
must change (from 0.15 to 0.18).  
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taxation of scarcity rents in which case labor supply is unaffected and net welfare rises by the
amount of the gain from the reduction in pollution.    An environmental policy that collects all of
the scarcity rents can eliminate the negative effects on pre-existing labor distortions.  Then the
policy can have unambiguously positive effects on welfare.
19
The remaining rows of Table 1 present some variations of key parameters.  The second
row indicates that doubling the marginal environmental damage (from 0.2 to 0.4) reduces the net
welfare loss from this environmental policy, but does not eliminate it if scarcity rents are untaxed. 
In this model, the environmental gains from reducing pollution (µ Y/L) are linear in µ, so it is easy
to calculate that the marginal external damage would have to be nearly 50% of the firm's
production cost for this environmental regulation to break even in terms of welfare if scarcity
rents are untaxed.  The importance of taxing scarcity rents is apparent when one compares the net
welfare effect when scarcity rents are taxed to the net effect when they are untaxed.  With social
marginal damages equal to 0.40, the regulation reducing pollution now raises welfare (0.012%) if
the scarcity rents are initially taxed at the same level as labor income.
The next two rows illustrate the effect of altering the initial labor tax rate.  If  t   is 0.3, L
instead of  0.40, the net welfare effect falls by 60%, but remains negative.   With this low labor
20
tax rate, welfare still falls unless  µ exceeds 29%.  If the initial tax rate is raised to 0.50, then the
welfare loss is increased by roughly 60% if profits are not taxed and over 70% if profits are taxed
at the same rate as labor income.  If scarcity rents are not taxed and the tax on labor income isˆ LY & ˆ Z ’ FY(ˆ pZ&ˆ pL)











50%, then the marginal environmental damage would have to be over 70% of production cost
before the regulatory policy could begin to improve welfare.  The last row is a combination of
parameter values that is designed to favor the regulation.  With "double damages" (µ=0.4) and
lower wage elasticity (,=0.2), the policy now raises welfare though the impact is quite small when
scarcity rents are untaxed..
  IV.  Model and Results with Variable Pollution per Unit Output
We now allow for factor substitution in the production of Y.  The welfare impact of an
environmental regulation still depends on how labor supply is affected, and equation (23) still
provides us the effect on labor supply from a change in output of Y.  The remaining step is to
show the effect on  Y  of a mandated change in emissions.
Let  F   represent the elasticity of substitution in production of  Y  between the two inputs Y
(L  and  Z).  Then, by definition: Y
The price of the labor is fixed, however, so equation (25) can be written as:
We showed above that  dY = dL  + dZ (equation 8), so the percentage change in output of  Y Y
can be expressed as a weighted average of the percentage changes in the two inputs:














ˆ L ’ (1&tA)
(1&tL)N(0&,)
(1&tA)N(0&,)&[FQ(1&N)%FY(LY/Z)](1&tL&,tL)
ˆ ZY / (1&tA)S ˆ ZY
ˆ Y ’ (Yˆ pY
ˆ pY ’ Z/Y ˆ pZ






cover the scarcity rents, so: 
(28) p Y  =  p L  + p Z Y L Y Z
Evaluated at initial prices of one (prior to the regulation), we have  Y = L  + Z.                        Y
Substitute equation (26) into equation (27) and use the relationship Y = L + Z to obtain
the following relationship:
Now recall that the full equilibrium effect on  Y, in equation (22), is   .  A footnote
after equation (15) derives   .  Together, these two relationships imply:
Substituting (30) into (29) provides the equilibrium relationship between Y and Z:
Note, by the way, that  L  = 0  means that   , for all results in the previous section.  Finally, Y
we substitute equation (31) into equation (23) and use the expression for  (    to get: Y
Expression (24) for the welfare effects of the policy now becomes:dU
8L
’ tL(1&tA)S & µ Z
L
ˆ Z / & Rˆ Z
ˆ L
ˆ Y ’ ˆ Z
ˆ Y ’ ˆ Z
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(33)
This expression redefines the net effect on welfare, R,  for the more general case with variable
emissions per unit output.  Under what circumstances does this expression reduce to the previous
one for fixed emissions?  To help interpret these expressions, we note some special cases.
First, if  t  = 1,  then again     in (32) is zero.  In this case a pollution tax is used to A
collect revenue for use in reducing the labor tax.  This policy has no effect on labor distortions,
and the only welfare effect is the unambiguous gain from correcting the externality  (µZ/L).  
Second, consider the case where  F  = 0.  Then equation (32) shows how   S  collapses to  Y
).  Also, because of fixed coefficient production,   .  This case is not quite comparable to
the previous case, however, because  Z  is only part of the production of  Y.  If the externality
arises only from  Z, and not from all of  Y, then the gain from correcting the externality  (µZ/L) is
effectively cut from its previous size (µY/L).  The loss from exacerbating labor supply distortions 
[t (1-t )S]  is the same as before, so the net loss of welfare is larger than before. L A
Third, instead, suppose  L  = 0.  Then  Y = Z,  so   ,  and equation (32) also shows Y
that  S  reduces to  ).  In this case, regardless of  F , all numerical results must match the Y
previous results.  But this case does not really involve "variable emissions per unit of output."
Fourth, however, we can still construct a case with variable emissions that will have
results comparable to those of the previous model.  We want pollution in the new model  (Z) to
be the same size as pollution in the old model  (Y), so we double the size of  Y  while assuming
that half of its input is  Z.  In other words, we set  L  = Z, and double the share of  Y  in Y
consumption,  N,  from  0.250  to  0.500.  Numerical results are shown in Table 2.ˆ Z
  Hamermesh (1993) surveys various estimates of the elasticity of substitution between
21
labor and capital in production and concludes that a value of 1 cannot be rejected.  While F  in Y
this study is a different measure, the evidence from Hamermesh suggests that a value of 1 may be
a useful central estimate.
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Again we consider a permit or CAC policy that mandates a small reduction in pollution
( <0).  The assumed parameter values all match the base case we had before (except that 
N=0.50, in order  for  Z/L  to match the previous  Y/L  at 0.15).  Also, we now have the
additional parameter,  F .  This parameter measures the ability to substitute clean inputs for dirty Y
inputs.  Given the uncertainties around the size of this elasticity, we consider a number of values.  
The four rows in Table 2 vary this parameter from zero to 2.0, and the last column shows the net
effect on welfare (R) .  This table can be used to demonstrate several points.
21
First, note that the welfare loss from this environmental regulation falls as the degree of
factor substitutability (F )  rises.  The regulation is simply not as costly when emissions can more Y
readily be avoided by using the other input instead.  Consider first the case where profits are not
taxed.  When factors are used in fixed proportions, and the government mandates a 1% cut in
emissions, then the efficiency loss from the labor distortion is .133% of national income.  When
the elasticity is increased to 0.5, this loss is reduced by 30%.  Doubling the elasticity to 1.0, or
again to 2.0, provides additional incremental reductions in the welfare loss.  A similar story holds
for the case where scarcity rents are taxed at 40%.  
Second, look at the third row with F  = 1.  These results exactly match those of the base Y
case in our previous model.  To explain this equivalence, note that the elasticity of substitution in
consumption (F ) is also set equal to one in the base case.  Thus all expenditure shares are Q
unchanged by policy shocks.  Consumers do not change the fraction of income spent on Y, and
producers of  Y  do not change the fraction of sales revenue spent on each input.  The economy-- 25 -
wide fraction of income spent on pollution was set to 0.15 for both models, and this overall share
is unchanged by policy, so the two models are functionally equivalent.  
Third, the net effect on welfare again is always negative for the case where scarcity rents
are taxed at a level no greater than 40%.  As we showed in the previous section, using "plausible"
parameter values, the mandated reduction in pollution has a cost from worsening the labor
distortion that exceeds the gain from starting to fix the pollution problem.  Results in this section
show that this likely conclusion is not reversed by allowing for any reasonable degree of
substitutability in production between clean inputs and dirty inputs.
Finally, we note, the important point from the variable emissions model is that pollution
can be controlled either by a factor substitution effect or by an output effect.  For the
environmental improvement, both effects are operating in the same direction.  Producers
substitute into cleaner inputs per unit of output, but the higher break-even price means that
consumers also buy less units of output.  For the labor distortion, however, the higher price of
output can reduce welfare, unless all available rents are captured and used to reduce labor taxes. 
V.  An Environmental Subsidy
So far, our results seem to suggest that environmental policy needs to raise revenue in
order to be able to reduce the labor tax and avoid exacerbating the pre-existing labor supply
distortion.  Perhaps policies could be ordered by their revenue effects.  After all, the
environmental tax can provide unambiguous welfare gains, while the mandated restrictions on
emissions that does not raise revenue usually provides a net welfare loss. One might think that an
environmental subsidy would rank lowest, in terms of welfare, since the government must balance
its budget and cover the cost of the subsidy by raising the tax on labor.
Perhaps surprisingly, these next two sections show that this logic is faulty.  The policyˆ tL ’ &
tL
1&tL
ˆ L % (1&N)ˆ s
ˆ w ’ & ˆ tL % (1&N)ˆ s




does not need to raise revenue in order to achieve the maximum net welfare gain.  Even the
environmental subsidy can have the positive effect of improving the environment without the
negative effect on the labor supply distortion.  Rather than keeping track of revenues, per se,
policy makers need to keep track of general equilibrium effects on the real net wage.
To demonstrate this point most clearly for an environmental subsidy, we revert
temporarily to the simple model with  Y = Z.  We then consider a subsidy (s) to the consumption
of the clean good (X), financed by an increase in the tax on labor.  The individual budget
constraint becomes  X(1-s) + p Y = (1-t )L.  This policy tilts the consumer toward purchase of  Y L
X, and therefore away from  Y.  The output  Y  is produced using only the single resource, which
is numeraire, so changes in the output of  Y  do not affect its price.  With competition among
firms, the policy generates no pure profits, and the government budget in equation (11) becomes:
(11') G = Nt L - NsX L
where the initial  s  is zero.  We differentiate, holding  G  constant, to get:
where   .  The real net wage is  w = (1-t)/p  , where  p  =  Np  + (1-N)(1-s).  Q Q Y
The price of  Y  does not change, so  dp  = (1-N)(-ds).  Thus, differentiating the real net wage Q
yields:
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Since profits are zero, the labor supply function is  L = L(w,0), and (18) reduces to:
As long as the initial point is not at the peak of the Laffer curve, where  , = (1-t )/t , these last L L
two equations imply that   .  This result is important, because overall welfare in
equation (24) depends on both a labor supply effect and the environmental quality effect.  This
policy has no effect on the real net wage, and therefore no negative effect on the pre-existing
labor supply distortion.  It has only the positive effect from improving the environment.
This point is important, so it warrants some elaboration.  The key is not that the
environmental policy raise revenue, but that it avoid adverse effects on the real net wage.  The
environmental tax raises product prices, and would thus reduce the real net wage unless the
revenue is used to reduce the labor tax.  Symmetrically, the environmental subsidy would reduce
product prices, and raise the real net wage, except that it requires the government to acquire the
necessary revenue by raising the labor tax.  Indeed, when properly specified, neither of these
policies raise revenue!  One policy is a revenue-neutral combination of a new environmental tax
plus reduction in the labor tax, and the other policy is a revenue-neutral combination of an
environmental subsidy plus increase in the labor tax.  Neither combination affects the real net
wage in this model.  The problem with the handout of permits and the restrictive CAC policy is
that they raise the cost of production without providing an offsetting effect on the labor tax rate.
These results carry through to the case with variable emissions.  The analogous- 28 -
environmental subsidy in this case would induce the firm to shift the mix of inputs away from
emissions by providing a subsidy to the clean input.  This subsidy would tend to reduce the cost of
production, and therefore the equilibrium price of output, so it would encourage more purchase of
the good produced using emissions.  However, the subsidy to the clean input can be financed by
introducing a tax on output of  Y.  Analogous derivations show that this policy balances the
government's budget while leaving the consumer's price of  Y  unchanged.  Thus the real net wage
and labor supply are unchanged.  In fact, as shown in Fullerton and Wolverton (1996), each
environmental tax has an equivalent two-part instrument.  Any tax on waste may be difficult to
enforce, and it can always be replaced by an equivalent combination of a presumptive tax on
production plus an environmental subsidy.
To further clarify that revenue-raising is not the important issue, consider a revenue-
neutral combination of a subsidy to the clean input and tax on the dirty input.  Is this policy a tax
that raises revenue (used to finance a subsidy), or is it a subsidy (financed by using a tax)?  The
question is not relevant.  In this model, for small changes, this two-part instrument shifts the mix
of inputs with no effect on output price and thus no effect on labor supply.  The result is an
unambiguous increase in welfare from the environment.  In fact, as shown in the next section, a
mandated change in the mix of inputs is equivalent to this revenue-neutral two-part policy of
incentives to shift the mix of inputs.
VI.  Technology Restrictions
Do all command and control policies raise production costs and exacerbate the labor
supply distortion?  Environmental authorities can choose among a number of different kinds of
controls.  If they hand out a limited number of permits, or otherwise just restrict the quantity of
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(34)
earns a scarcity rent.  If those profits do not accrue to the government, we showed above that the
policy does exacerbate labor supply distortions.  Similarly, a "new source performance standard"
erects a barrier to entry by raising costs for new firms only.  Suppose instead, however, that the
authorities were to impose a technological requirement on the production process for all firms. 
For example, suppose every firm must have a scrubber on every smokestack.  This rule might
raise costs, but it does not restrict entry, it does not provide an advantage to existing firms, and it
does not limit the quantity of emissions.  It cannot generate profits in our model, because other
firms have access to the exact same constant-returns-to-scale technology and would enter to share
those profits.
This kind of technological restriction can be analyzed in our model as a forced change in
emissions (Z) per unit of output (Y), or equivalently, a forced change in the ratio of inputs (L /Z).  Y
In other words, instead of the policy   , we analyze the policy   .  Firms have a
number of ways to comply with this restriction.  They can cut emissions, or they can just use more
of the clean input.  They could even increase emissions, so long as they increase clean inputs (and
thus output) more than proportionately.  In order to look at the firm's problem in terms of levels,
rather than changes, suppose the initial equilibrium quantities are  Y  = F(L ,Z ).  Then the new
0 0 0
Y
policy restricts the choice of  L   and  Z  such that Y
The initial ratio of inputs (L /Z ) is taken as given by policy makers, existing firms, and even Y

















Because of constant returns to scale, in this model, the same ratio of inputs would be
22




potential entrants.   Policy makers specify the required increase in that ratio (r).  Any existing
22
firm or entrant takes those two parameters  (L /Z  and  r)  as given. Y
0 0
The initial equilibrium has no restriction ® = 0), and we find a new equilibrium with a
small increase in  r.  In particular, we want to know if this restriction helps the environment more
than it exacerbates the labor supply distortion.  Perhaps surprisingly, our first result is that a small
increase in  r  has no effect on production costs and therefore no effect on the price of Y.  As a
consequence, it has no effect on the real net wage or the pre-existing labor supply distortion.  In
general, the firm chooses  L   and  Z  to minimize: Y
Define  C   as the optimized cost function.  By the envelope theorem,  >   is the marginal cost of
*
1
production (MC /MY)  while  >   is the shadow price of the regulatory constraint (MC /Mr).  We
* *
2
want to know how the policy (r) affects the marginal cost of production (> ), that is, the 1
magnitude of  d> /dr.   Second partials are invariant to the order of differentiation, so: 1
Thus, to see how marginal cost changes with  r, we need only consider how the shadow price on
the regulatory constraint changes with Y.  Meanwhile, constant returns to scale in  F(L ,Z)  Y








Figure 1.  Marginal Cost and Regulation
ˆ L ’ ,ˆ w ’ 0
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(9')
words, changes in  Y have no impact on > .  Since  d> /dY = 0,  equation (36) implies that  d> /dr 2 2 1
= 0.  And with competition among firms, no change in marginal cost means no change in output
price.  Thus the policy does not affect the real net wage.
In the absence of profits, labor supply  is   .  Also, since the price of  Y  is
unchanged, the demand for  Y  must be unchanged.  Essentially, firms switch from  Z=L   into  L   Z Y
with no change in total use of resources  L, and no change in output.  But then we know that  Z 
falls, so the welfare effect in (9) reduces to:
These results may seem surprising: how can an environmental restriction leave the
marginal cost of production unchanged?  To provide some intuition on this question, consider
how the optimized cost function  C   is related to the regulatory parameter  r.  Also, because of
*
constant returns to scale, this total cost can be taken for one unit of output and interpreted as
marginal cost.  This cost per unit output is minimized by the firm's unrestricted choices at the
initial point where  r = 0, so it must be higher at any  r ￿ 0.  The curve must look like:ˆ Z < 0
(ˆ LY&ˆ Z) >< 0
These technological restrictions are perfectly efficient in our model, like the pollution
23
tax, or sale of permits, with revenue used to reduce the labor tax.  However, our model does not
capture differences among firms' abatement cost functions.  If these costs differ, then to remain as
efficient as a tax or permit policy, a technology-based CAC policy would have to specify which
firms must change which technologies.   Information problems may become prohibitive. 
- 32 -
Thus costs are higher with  r ￿ 0, as one would expect.  But, evaluated at  r = 0, the curve is flat. 
From the initial starting point, a small change in  r  has no effect on cost.  We only look at small
changes, using this methodology, so this policy has no perceptible effect on cost.  As the policy
becomes more restrictive, however, it would begin to raise the cost of production.  Since the
marginal cost of environmental protection is the increment to production cost, we have just
shown that the marginal cost curve for environmental protection starts at the origin.  We do not
find the optimal degree of protection, that is, where the rising marginal cost curve intersects the
falling marginal benefit curve.  We only show that, for positive initial marginal benefits of
protection (µ>0), the first small restriction unambiguously raises welfare.  
23
In a way, these considerations make the prior results more surprising.  What we showed
above is that a small restriction on emissions      does have an impact on cost.  Because the
firm must cover the scarcity rent on every unit of emissions, production become more expensive. 
The profits are not dissipated, because entry is limited by the fixed limit on emissions.  In contrast,
the technology restriction     has two parts, and no absolute limit on emissions. 
These two parts generate a sort of cross-subsidy within the firm.  Emissions may be reduced, such
that the marginal product  F   rises above private cost (p  = 1), but, to produce the same output, Z Z
labor is increased such that its marginal product  F   falls below private cost  (p  = 1).  Implicitly, L L
profits on emissions are offset by losses on use of labor, as necessary to satisfy the restriction,
with no net profits.
Thus the technology restriction is equivalent to the revenue-neutral combination of theBarnett (1980) also considers a Pigouvian tax in the case where a monopolist generates
24
pollution.  In his partial equilibrium model, however, he does not consider other distortions. 
Another possibility is monopoly in the clean sector,  X.  Then the regulatory reduction in  Y  will
tend to offset the monopolist's reduction in  X  relative to  Y, but reinforce the wage tax effect of
reducing both goods relative to leisure.  We leave these questions for future research.
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small environmental tax on  Z  and subsidy to  L   .  In one case the government collects the Y
"profits" on  Z  to cover "losses" on  L  , and in the other case the government forces the firm to Y
use profits on  Z  to cover its own losses on  L   .  The two outcomes are equivalent.  Again, this Y
result clarifies that the important distinction is not whether the policy raises revenue. The problem
is not when the CAC policy raises no revenue, but when it generates privately-retained rents.
VII.  Model and Results with Monopoly Production 
To this point, we have assumed that all markets are perfectly competitive, but we now
explore how environmental policies affect welfare in the presence of imperfect competition.  To
be specific, we consider the case where the polluting good (Y) is provided by a monopolist.     In
24
all other regards, we maintain the model developed in the previous sections.  However, to keep
the analysis simple, we revert to the fixed-emissions model in which  Y  is produced using only
labor (Y=Z).   Our economy now has three pre-existing distortions: a wage tax, a monopolist, and
an uncorrected externality.  As a consequence, the welfare effect of any particular change cannot
be known a priori.  The initial equilibrium production of  Y  may be too low because of the
monopolist, or too high because of the externality.  Similarly, even the initial labor supply may be
above or below the welfare-maximizing level.  Any environmental policy that requires a reduction
in  Y  will alleviate some problems and exacerbate others.  We solve for the general equilibrium
effect of a small policy on all three distortions. 
The production relationships are linear as in our first model above.  The household budget
constraint is still given by (14), but after-tax monopoly profits (1-t )A  exist prior to the ApY & 1 ’
pY
,Y
ˆ A ’ ˆ Y % ,Yˆ pY.
ˆ Y ’ &,Yˆ pY.
We set parameters below such that the initial  p   is 1.2, so that profits are 20% of the
25
Y
cost of production of  Y, but then (38) implies that  ,   is six.  We also derive the corresponding Y
value of  F , which also must exceed one.  Thus we cannot use the same parameters as in Section Q





implementation of any environmental policy.  These profits are defined by:
(37) A = (p  - 1)Y Y
The firm maximizes these profits by choosing  Y  (or equivalently  p , given the demand curve).  Y
We define  ,   as the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand for Y, so the firm's first- Y
order condition is:
The degree to which the price of  Y  exceeds marginal cost depends on the elasticity of demand
for  Y.  The higher is   , , the less distortion is created by having a monopoly in the production of Y
Y.  Equation (38) can only be satisfied if the monopolist produces in the portion of the demand
curve where the elasticity is greater than one.
25
Totally differentiating the definition of profits in (37), and using the first order condition
for the monopolist in (38) yields:
Also, along a demand curve where income and other prices are constant, the consumer's behavior




ˆ X ’ & N
1&N
(ˆ Y % ˆ pY).
,Y ’ N % (1&N)FQ.
ˆ A ’ 0.
Since utility is separable between consumption and leisure, we can express preferences
26
between the two goods either in terms of the price elasticity of demand for one of the goods or in
terms of the elasticity of substitution between  X  and  Y.  To be consistent with our earlier





The firm uses the demand curve in (40) to arrive at its maximizing behavior in (39), so
substitution yields  .  That is, the firm cannot increase profits by movement in either
direction along the demand curve.  We use (39) to calculate a change in profits that is not zero,
however, for an environmental regulation that shifts the demand curve by changing income and
other prices.  Also, occasionally, it will be useful to write profits as:
where the first equality reflects the definition of profits in (37) and the second equality reflects the
firm's behavior in (38).  The far right expression for profits is written in terms of  , , the demand Y
elasticity  for Y.  In turn, this demand elasticity can be expressed as a function F , defined in Q
equation (20) as the elasticity of substitution between the two consumption goods.  
26
Differentiating the household budget constraint (holding income constant) yields:
Then, combining equations (20), (40), and (42) yields:
Given that  ,   must exceed 1, the monopoly solution also requires that  F   be greater than 1. Y Q
To obtain an expression for the welfare impact of regulation, we follow steps similar todU
8L
’ tLˆ L & µ Y
L




ˆ Y ˆ L
An important issue is how to specify the counterfactual.  Under one scenario, we could
27
take  Y/L  from the previous competitive model, and suppose that output of  Y  were to become
monopolized.  We would then calculate a new lower  Y/L  for the monopoly case, and a new
lower benefit from reduction of pollution (µY/L).  Under a different scenario,  Y/L  is an
observed value like 0.15, and we ask what would happen if that outcome represented a
monopolized sector instead of a competitive sector.  We take this latter course, since it maintains
the size of the polluting sector (and thus  µY/L)  across the two models.
- 36 -
(44)
those in the derivation of  dU/8L  in equation (9).  We totally differentiate the utility function as
before, and we use the same first order conditions for consumer maximization as before, but we
also use the definition of profits.  These steps yield: 
The first two terms are identical to those in equation (9) for the effect on the labor distortion and
the effect on the externality distortion, but this expression has a third term to account for the extra
effect on the monopoly distortion .  The usual partial equilibrium model might compare the last
27
two terms to see if the monopolist raises price toward (or above) the social marginal cost of
output.  For example, if the initial  p   is 1.2, then profits are 20% of the cost of production of  Y.  Y
If this  Y  is still 15% of total output,  then  (A/L)  is  0.03  in the equation above.  The policy 
<0  has a negative effect on welfare from exacerbating the monopoly distortion.  But if  µ=0.2,
then  µ(Y/L) is also  0.03  in equation (44), and these two effects exactly offset.  The monopolist
already raises price to 1.2, which exactly reflects the social marginal cost of production (1+µ). 
However, that partial equilibrium model neglects the effect of     on     in the first term of (44). 
We show below that labor supply, and thus welfare, must fall.  The implication is that the reverse
policy with a forced increase in output would raise welfare (despite the externality).
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social cost of production or raises price above the marginal social cost of production.  Therefore,
in numerical results below, we use  p  = 1.2, and  set  µ  to either 0.1 or 0.3. Y
To find the general equilibrium effect on labor supply, we again start with the
government's balanced-budget adjustment to the tax rate on labor.  Any pre-existing tax rate on
profits is not adjusted.  The government budget constraint in equation (11) is unchanged, but now
profits exist prior to the imposition of any new policy.  Moreover, the change in profits is driven
by equation (39).  We differentiate equation (11), use the expression for profits in equation (41)
as well as the change in profits in equation (39) to obtain:
where  S   is the share of after-tax labor income in total after-tax household income. L
Next, labor supply is a function of the real net wage and real nonlabor income.  Thus 
environmental regulations affect labor supply both through the effect of     on     (equation 15)
and the effect of     on     (equation 39).   We differentiate the labor supply function to get:
where  S   is the share of after-tax profits in after-tax income.  We then use (39) and (43) to A
rewrite this expression as:
The expression in parentheses is the percentage change in real profits.  Labor supply is affected by
changes in the real after-tax wage through  ,  (including both substitution and income effects)  asˆ X ’ &
pYY
X
( ˆ Y % ˆ pY) %
(1&tL)L
X
(ˆ L & ˆ tL) % (1&tA)A
X
ˆ A.












well as changes in real profits through 0  (effect of nonlabor income).
Finally, we need an expression for the change in the price of  Y  attributable to the
environmental policy.  We can use the equilibrium relationship between  Y  and  p   to obtain this Y
expression.  Totally differentiate the household budget constraint:
Substitute this equation into equation (20), and use equations (39), (43), and (45) to get:
At this point, if we take     as an exogenous policy parameter, we have four equations that are
linear in four unknowns.  By successive substitution, or Cramer's Rule, equations (15), (45), (47),
and (49) can be solved for   ,   ,   ,  and   .  The long expression for      is not worth
repeating here, but we use it to measure the welfare impact of a required reduction in  Y.
For parameter values, we cannot use the same selections as before.  Most importantly, we
can no longer assume a unit elasticity of substitution between  X  and  Y.  We proceed by first
assuming that the monopolist has set  p  = 1.2, so that  profits are 20% of the output of  Y.  Then Y
equation (38) says that  ,   must be 6, and equation  (43) says that  F   must be 9.  These values Y Q
may seem high, but our model only has two commodities.  The reality that constrains the price
charged by a monopolist from being even higher is that some other good can serve as a reasonably
close substitute.  Then, to be able to compare results, we use this value of  F   in both the Q








ones to hold constant between the two models.  In the competitive model, once we fix  Y  as 15%
of output and choose the labor tax rate as 0.40, then government provision must be 40% of
output and   X  must be the remaining 45% of output.  These ratios generate  N = 1/4  for the
expenditure on  Y  as a share of the consumer's budget.  In the monopoly model, the price of  Y 
exceeds its production cost.  We choose to match the share of  Y  in total output (Y/L) across
models, to keep the pollution impacts comparable, but then the higher price on  Y  in the
monopoly model means that consumers must be spending more of their income on  Y.  Thus  N 
will not match its value in the competitive model.  Once we fix  Y/L,  t , and  F , these A Q
parameters determine the initial profits, the initial profits tax revenue, and  X/L.  An additional
change arises from the existence of profits prior to the policy.  If the pre-existing  t   is positive, A
we keep government spending at 40% of national output by reducing the initial tax on labor
supply according to:
Table 3 presents results for these parameters when  Y  is provided by a monopolist and for
purposes of comparison, also in a perfectly competitive market.  We first analyze results for the
perfectly competitive model.  Note that the results for the perfectly competitive market  differ
from those in Table 1 by assuming a greater degree of substitutability between  X  and  Y  in
consumption.  And because consumers have this greater ability to substitute in consumption, the
forced reduction in  Y  has less impact on raising the price of  Y.  The consequence is a smaller
decrease in the real net wage and a lower loss from increasing the labor market distortion. 
Compare the first row of Table 3 to the first row of Table 1 to see the impact of increasing  F   Q
from 1 to 9.  The labor market loss is cut by more than 80%, from .071 to .012.  Since this loss is- 40 -
so much smaller, and the environmental gain is still 0.03, this change in  F   has converted the Q
overall effect on welfare from negative in Table 1 to positive in Table 3.  The next row in Table 3
shows that increasing the marginal environmental damage from 0.2 to 0.3 also increases this net
gain.  Decreasing the marginal environmental damage from 0.3 to 0.1 reduces the net gain but not
below zero.  The remaining rows keep  µ=0.3  and show the effect of alternative values for the
initial tax on profits.  As in Table 1, a higher tax on profits reduces the change in the after tax
scarcity rent which blunts the fall in labor supply through an income effect.  With 100% profits tax
(last row), all incremental labor market distortions are eliminated and the net welfare gain simply
equals the gain from correcting the externality.
The second part of Table 3 presents results from the monopoly model.  First note that the
tax rate on wage income is no longer fixed at 40%.  With pre-existing profits, a higher initial
profits tax implies that a lower initial labor tax is required to raise 40% of national income.  The
first three rows present results for the case where profits are untaxed (and the labor tax is 40%). 
The reduction in labor supply in the monopoly model is about half of the reduction in the perfect
competition model (as evidenced by the loss from the labor market distortion in columns 5 and 9). 
Households do not reduce labor supply as much in the monopoly model because the
environmental policy reduces profits and leisure is a normal good.    When  µ is less than 0.28
however, the net welfare effect of the regulation turns from positive in the competitive model to
negative in the monopoly model.  The reason is that this monopolist has already raised price  (pY
= 1.2) above social marginal cost  (1+µ).  The loss from the monopoly distortion combined with
the loss from the labor distortion exceeds the environmental gain.
When  µ = 0.3, the monopolist with  p  = 1.2  has not restricted output "enough."  In this Y




When the profits tax rate is zero, the 40% labor tax raises enough to provide spending
28
that is 40% of total output (L).  The next row finds the single tax rate on both profits and labor
(38.5%) that raises the same revenue for the initial equilibrium.  The last row considers a 100%
profits tax, so the same spending is possible with a labor tax of only 36%.
We assume the firm continues to maximize profits despite the 100% tax rate.
29
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Now the net effect depends on the labor distortion!  What happens to the labor distortion in the
monopoly model?  In Table 3, the loss from the labor distortion is always a paltry 0.006,
regardless of the level of profits tax.   Why?
28
First, the impact on labor is reduced substantially by the use of   F  = 9, as mentioned Q
above, in both the competitive model and the monopoly model.  The effect of the policy on the
price of  Y  is not so important when consumers can substitute into other goods.  Second, in the
monopoly model, the policy reduces pre-existing profits, and leisure is normal, so the fall in labor
is smaller still.  These factors bring     down to only -.015, which is multiplied by  t =0.4 to get L
the loss in welfare in equation (44).
Third, comparing the last three rows of Table 3, a higher initial profits tax means that this
income effect is smaller.  Thus the dampening effect on the change in labor of the fall in profits is
smaller, and labor supply falls more.  This income effect changes     even though the real wage
falls by roughly the same percentage (-.058) in all three rows.  With the tax on profits, the same
reduction in profits (  ￿  -.038 in all rows) simply has less of an impact on labor supply.  The fall
in labor supply is -.017 in the last row of Table 3 with 100% profits taxation .  Since the real net
29
wage falls by 0.058, and  , = 0.3, labor supply falls by  -.017 with no separate income effect: the
drop in profits no longer offsets the wage drop to induce more labor supply.
Finally, even though the higher profits tax enlarges the effect on labor supply, it reduces
the initial required labor tax.  The net effect on welfare is the product,  , so these two effects- 42 -
offset each other, and the loss from the labor distortion is essentially unchanged at 0.006.
The results from this section illustrate a couple of points about environmental policies that
restrict output.  First, the exacerbation of distortions arising from imperfect competition can be
very important and could potentially more than offset any gains from improving the environment,
even ignoring effects on labor supply.  This point may be particularly important for energy-
producing industries, those most likely to fail conditions for perfect competition.  Second, these
monopoly results affect the previous result in the competitive model where we emphasized that
government could prevent the fall in the real net wage if it were to capture all of the scarcity rents
by100% profits tax, or by sale instead of handout of permits.  This result does not hold in a model
with pre-existing profits.  The problem is that the environmental policy affects both marginal and
inframarginal profits.  In the case of complete profits taxation, profits still fall by -.038% for a 1%
output restriction.  This change requires government to increase the tax on wages to make up lost
tax on profits.  The result is that a 1% output restriction still reduces the real net wage by 
0.058%. 
VIII.  Conclusion
We have considered a number of environmental policies in different general equilibrium
models to assess how these policies interact with pre-existing distortions.  Whether we analyze
tradeable pollution permits, direct controls on emissions, subsidies for non-polluting activities, or
mandated technology adoptions, we find a common theme in our results.  The magnitude of the
welfare gain (or possibly the loss) due to new environmental policies in the face of pre-existing
distortions depends critically on 1) whether the policy generates scarcity rents and 2) whether
those rents are captured by the government and used to lower other distorting taxes.  In our first
set of models, where producers are perfectly competitive, environmental policies enhance welfare- 43 -
by reducing pollution but can reduce welfare by discouraging labor supply.  The net welfare
change depends on the relative size of these two factors.  The key in these models to
understanding the impact on labor supply is to focus on the real net wage.  When a policy
generates scarcity rents, it leads to an increase in the price level that reduces the real net wage and
hence labor supply.  The only way to avoid this adverse effect on efficiency is for government to
capture the rents (through a 100% tax on profits, or the sale of all tradeable permits), or to avoid
generating the rents (through mandated technologies for all existing firms and entrants).  Thus,
much of the focus in our paper is on the sources and disposition of these scarcity rents.
Recognizing the importance of scarcity rents clarifies a source of possible confusion in the
“double dividend” literature.  Much of the emphasis in this literature has been the role that the
revenue from the Pigouvian tax plays in allowing a reduction in other tax rates.  Our analysis of
different policies shows that this emphasis is misplaced.  Following the double-dividend literature's
assumption that the budget is balanced by adjusting the labor tax rate, we demonstrate equivalent
welfare results whether government were to 1) raise revenue by taxing pollution or selling
tradeable permits,  2) lose revenue by subsidizing the clean alternative to the polluting good or
input, or 3) collect no revenue by using a technology mandate.  Small changes in any of these
three directions have no effect on the real net wage or on the labor market distortion.
We derive these results analytically in a number of models.  We first consider the case
where pollution is directly associated with a final commodity, and we then extend the model to the
case where pollution is associated with an input to production.  This latter case allows for
examination of the possibility that substitution in production can mitigate welfare losses.  We
consider the interaction among three distortions: imperfect competition, pre-existing taxes, and
pollution.  To our knowledge, our effort is the first to examine these three distortions- 44 -
simultaneously in a general equilibrium model.  The ability to consider a wide variety of policies in
a number of different models illustrates the power of the comparative statics approach that we
employ in this paper.- 45 -
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Table 1
Welfare Effect of a Small Cut in a Polluting Good:





t  = 0 t  = t A A L
Loss from  Net Effect on Loss from  Net Effect
Labor Welfare Labor on Welfare
Distortion Distortion
t , µ Y/L µ(Y/L) t (1-t )) R t (1-t )) R L L A L A
.4 .3 .2 0.15 0.030 0.071 -0.041 0.048 -0.018
.4 .3 .4 0.15 0.060 0.071 -0.011 0.048 0.012
.3 .3 .2 0.18 0.035 0.052 -0.017 0.039 -0.004
.5 .3 .2 0.13 0.025 0.091 -0.066 0.056 -0.031
.4 .2 .4 0.15 0.060 0.058 0.002 0.039 0.021
The four parameters in the first part of the table are: tax rate on labor income (t ), uncompensated labor supply elasticity (,), L
social marginal damage of pollution (µ) and the production of the dirty good as a fraction of total output (Y/L).  Other parameter
values are as follows: elasticity of substitution in consumption (F ) equals 1.0, income elasticity of labor supply (0) equals -0.3 and the Q
expenditure share of the dirty good in consumption (N) equals 0.25.  See text for details.  - 49 -
Table 2
Welfare Effect of a Small Cut in Emissions:




t  = 0 t  = t A A L
Loss from  Net Effect on Loss from  Net Effect
Labor Welfare Labor on Welfare
Distortion Distortion
F µ(Z/L) t (1-t )) R t (1-t )) R Y L A L A
0.00 0.030 0.133 -0.103 0.103 -0.073
0.50 0.030 0.092 -0.062 0.065 -0.035
1.00 0.030 0.071 -0.041 0.048 -0.018
2.00 0.030 0.048 -0.018 0.031 -0.001
The parameter in the first part of the table is the elasticity of substitution in production (F ) Other parameter values are as follows: tax Y
rate on labor income (t ) equals 0.40, uncompensated labor supply elasticity (,) equals 0.30, social marginal damage of pollution (µ) L
equals 0.20,  elasticity of substitution in consumption (F ) equals 1.0, income elasticity of labor supply (0) equals -0.3 and the Q
expenditure share of the dirty good in consumption (N) equals 0.50.  See text for details.  tLˆ L tLˆ L
- 50 -
Table 3
Welfare Effects of a Mandated Reduction in Emissions:









Tax Rate Tax Rate
on Labor on Labor Net Effect
t t L
Loss from Loss from Loss from
Labor Net Effect Monopoly Labor






0 0.2 0.030 0.40 0.012 0.018 0.40 0.030 0.006 -0.006
0 0.3 0.045 0.40 0.012 0.033 0.40 0.030 0.006 0.009
0 0.1 0.015 0.40 0.012 0.003 0.40 0.030 0.006 -0.021
t 0.3 0.045 0.40 0.007 0.038 0.388 0.030 0.006 0.009 L
1.0 0.3 0.045 0.40 0 0.045 0.37 0.030 0.006 0.009
Government spending is  40%  of total output, the uncompensated labor supply elasticity  ,  is .3, the labor supply income elasticity  0 
is  -.3, and the elasticity of substitution in consumption   F   is 9.  The pollution generating good comprises 15% of total output.  Prior Q
to the mandated restriction, the price of  Y  is  1  in the competitive model, and  1.2  in the monopoly model.  The share  N  is  1/4  in
the competitive model and  .286  in the monopoly model.  ,   equals  6.25  in the competitive model and  6  in the monopoly model. Y